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In the wake of China’s rapid ascendancy, are there any new rules made by
the country in global health governance? This article examines China’s
emerging role in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights and finds that China adopts a pro–status quo stance on
patented medicines. Aspiring to develop its own pharmaceutical sector to
be capable to produce patented medicines on a par with the West, it has
little appetite for using the prevailing rules or making new rules that are
to the liking of the developing world. Undoubtedly, China is a new player
in global health governance but has yet to have agenda-setting intent and
capacity. This article argues that China’s behavior and preferences can be
explained by its dualistic national identities, the dominant position of re-
alism in both the study of international relations and policy circles, and an
underdevelopment of epistemic community in global health governance
in the country. KEYWORDS: China, global health governance, TRIPS agree-
ment, national identity, realism.
DOES CHINA’S RISE INEVITABLY LEAD TO SYSTEMIC CHANGES IN GLOBAL GOVER-
nance? With a global shift in the balance of power toward the Global South
in the wake of China’s rapid ascendancy, one may ask if there are new rules
in global health governance. In discussing the role of great powers in global
health governance, which he calls post-Westphalian public health, David
Fidler argues that on the one hand “the . . . global health governance mecha-
nisms in the SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] outbreak provides
evidence that the great powers’ influence in post-Westphalian public health is
diminished,” while on the other “the context of post-Westphalian public
health heightens the importance of the great powers in new ways.”1 He refers
to the fact that, although the Westphalian regime initially built by European
powers has fallen apart in the wake of the outbreak of SARS in 2002–2003,
a new post-Westphalian regime must be created by the great powers because
only they have the required material resources to do so. This claim is given
empirical support by the historical development of global health governance.
A multilateral public health regime began to take shape in the mid–nineteenth
century well before the emergence of the notion of global health governance
in scholarly and policymaking circles in the 1990s. The driving force behind
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this multilateralism was a handful of major powers in Europe, which took
great pains to stem the spread of contagious diseases from the less developed
Asian, African, and Latin American countries while protecting their own
trade interests.2 Not surprisingly, the developing world was excluded from
the rule-making process and institutions. Whereas “great powers” were
referred to as the European states and the United States from the mid–nine-
teenth century to the end of the twentieth century, what is meant by “great
powers” in the early twenty-first century? 
While it is now common knowledge that China has emerged as a rapidly
growing power on the world stage, China may not be a pro–status quo power
in its participation in global governance since it is often of the view that the
current rules of international institution are systematically weighted against
the interests of the developing world, with the more powerful states imposing
their favored liberal rules on the weak.3 This seems to confirm a received
wisdom nicely summarized as: “When rising powers join the world system,
they want to remake rules that they did not shape and that they do not see as
serving their interests.”4 It is therefore interesting and pertinent to ask
whether this emerging power will counteract the established powers in
Europe and North America in the governance of global public health. In this
article, we focus on China’s policies toward the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement), which involves
the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), and aim to account for China’s incentive or disincen-
tive to forge a new global health regime. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom that holds that China, as a rapidly
developing non-Western great power, would likely reshape the making and
implementation of the principles, norms, and rules in the international institu-
tions, we find that by and large China has stayed on the periphery of global
health governance as far as the TRIPS agreement is concerned. It neither
makes use of the flexibilities accorded by the agreement to produce more
affordable medicines for impoverished patients in the developing world nor
takes steps to put forward systemic changes in the agreement in favor of
developing countries. This puzzle drives us to examine closely how China
develops its preferences for the global health regime and how it pursues them. 
We first provide a succinct description of the controversial issues of the
TRIPS agreement with regard to public health, followed by China’s responses
to them. Drawing on mainstream international relations perspectives and
adopting an analytic eclectic approach, we then analyze and explain China’s
roles in and preferences for the global health regime. We postulate an argu-
ment that China’s behavior and preferences can be explained by its dualistic
national identities, the dominant position of realpolitik thought in the coun-
try, and a lack of an epistemic community in health governance. Finally, we
use this framework to illustrate China’s agenda in public health and its impli-
cations for global health governance.
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The TRIPS Agreement, 
the Doha Declaration, and Public Health
One of the international public laws that has direct impacts on global public
health is the TRIPS agreement under the WTO. In order to ensure that private
corporations, mostly from developed countries, have the incentive to invest
in research and development (R&D) of new products, the TRIPS agreement
sets down the minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property
regulations (patent protection) that would eventually apply to all WTO mem-
bers. However, this patent protection has sparked debates between developed
and developing countries (as well as their respective nonstate supporters) on
the costs and benefits of intellectual property rights (IPR) to public health. 
Under the TRIPS agreement, the pharmaceutical industry has the right to
a twenty-year monopoly on its inventions. No one can register a generic
product without the patent holder’s agreement during the life of the patent.5
Although the TRIPS agreement itself allows developing countries to override
drug patents by issuing “compulsory licences” to manufacture generic anti-
retrovirals (ARVs) under Article 31(f), generic drugs produced under a com-
pulsory license “shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use” (emphasis added). In
other words, the compulsory licensing provisions would be of little help to
most developing countries that do not have sufficient manufacturing capacity
to produce ARVs domestically. This outstanding issue could not be resolved
in the WTO ministerial conferences in Seattle (1999) and in Doha (2001) and
was only noted in Paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration.6 It was eventually
addressed in August 2003 in an interim WTO TRIPS Council decision after
a shift in US policy. The interim decision, a waiver to set aside Article 31(f)
but not a deletion, was eventually made permanent in an amendment to the
TRIPS agreement in December 2005. However, the amendment has yet to
take effect, pending ratification by two-thirds of WTO members.7
Nevertheless, since its setup in August 2003, the so-called Paragraph 6
system has been successfully used only once for less developed countries,
when Rwanda imported generic HIV/AIDS medications from Apotex, a
Canadian generic pharmaceutical company.8 The extremely rare use of com-
pulsory license has spurred another debate on whether the current global
patent rules are compatible with public health. During the TRIPS Council
meeting on 1 March 2011 members, largely from the developing world,
claimed that the Paragraph 6 system was “almost unusable because of com-
plex procedural requirements.”9 According to Apotex, the procedures taken to
manufacture and export the generic medicine “are simply too difficult and
complicated” and it “will not use [them] again.”10
In addition, the TRIPS agreement is often blamed by developing coun-
tries as well as civil society organizations for making the prices of essential
medicines prohibitively high and, as a result, preventing the poor from gain-
ing access to life-prolonging or life-sustaining medications and treatment.
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They argue that the patent protection under the TRIPS agreement favors and
protects the interests of big pharmaceutical companies at the expense of the
protection of human rights.11 The international outcry on the high cost of HIV
antiretroviral medications has drawn growing attention to the importance of
access to essential drugs and medications, which has been regarded as part of
human rights in health by the WHO.12 While the TRIPS Council has been
revisiting the Paragraph 6 system since October 2010,13 patents on medicines
and IPR remain an unresolved issue driving developed and developing coun-
tries apart. More seriously, beyond the WTO framework, the United States
and European developed countries have tried to tighten its grip on the global
IPR regime and patent laws by pushing forward TRIPS-plus provisions in
bilateral and regional free trade agreements that would undermine the flexi-
bilities accorded by the Doha declaration.14 Given those constraints, a seem-
ingly viable option is to pursue South-South cooperation whereby moderately
developed countries with fairly developed pharmaceutical sectors enter into
joint ventures with the least developed countries to produce generic drugs
locally. On request from Kampala, a $38 million joint venture between
India’s Cipla and Uganda’s Quality Chemicals Ltd. was set up in 2007 to pro-
duce ARVs in the African country.15 This venture is hailed as opening up
whole new vistas for global health governance.16 Following on from the
India-Uganda model of cooperation, Mozambique is in partnership with
Brazil to build a plant to manufacture generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and other
diseases.17
A key aspect of our study was determining whether China—a relatively
new member of the WTO, an emerging power from the South with sufficient
manufacturing capability, and a self-proclaimed “responsible developing
great power” that is willing to fight for the good cause of developing coun-
tries and champions for South-South cooperation—has made any effort to
press for a structural reform of the global health regime, or utilize the exist-
ing TRIPS flexibilities, or promote South-South cooperation to produce
affordable medicines for the least developed countries. 
China’s Response to TRIPS
To what extent then has China been using the prevailing rules or making new
rules that favor the developing world and contribute to an increased avail-
ability of essential medicines for the poor? In this section, we focus on
China’s response to compulsory licensing under the Doha declaration and its
subsequent changes in 2003 and 2005. 
Initiating a Structural Reform Within the WTO?
China joined the WTO in December 2001, a month after the Doha declaration
was endorsed.18 According to Rong Min, China’s representative to the WTO,
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China actively participated in all of the negotiation meetings from the begin-
ning of 2002 to 30 August 2003 that eventually led to the adoption of the
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.19 In its
first major speech after becoming a WTO member, China declared rhetori-
cally that it would serve as a “bridge” between developed and developing
countries.20 During the negotiations of a post-TRIPS agreement, China allied
with developing countries to propose a revision of Article 31(f) to the effect
that the WTO should provide more space for these countries to formulate
their own public health policy.21 Rong even criticizes the Doha declaration
for looking like a breakthrough in compulsory licensing but in fact only
reflecting an imbalance between rights and obligations for developing mem-
bers, and states that this imbalance is almost impossible to correct in reality.22
This line of argument is often reiterated by other high-ranking Chinese gov-
ernment officials.23 Chinese scholars also echo that developing countries
have never received any benefit from the post-TRIPS accords.24
On the surface, China is steadfastly opposed to the Western-dominated
intellectual property regime. However, its rhetoric differs from its actual pol-
icy regarding generic pharmaceutical drugs. While China lends verbal support
to developing countries during the post-TRIPS negotiations within the WTO,
it does not, however, play a leadership role in transforming or revising the
agreement. A detailed study shows that between 1995 and 2007, developing
countries made a total of forty-six TRIPS-related submissions about public
health to the WTO, of which eleven were from the African Group, eleven from
Asia, and the remaining twenty-four from Latin America and the Caribbean.
The eleven Asian submissions were from India (three), Indonesia (three), Pak-
istan (three), and the Philippines (two), indicating that China was not active in
the TRIPS revision and global intellectual property reform.25 Other studies
also point to the same conclusion that Brazil, India, and the African Group—
rather than China—played significant roles in the post-TRIPS negotiations.26
Furthermore, China did not accept the aforementioned 2005 amendment (i.e.,
a waiver to set aside Article 31(f)) until November 2007, almost two years
after the approval of the change, whereas the United States and Switzerland
swiftly ratified it in December 2005 and September 2006, respectively.27
China continued this passive posture until the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and other developed countries pushed for a strengthening of the
enforcement of TRIPS standards by drafting an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) outside both the WTO and the UN. ACTA is a plurilateral
agreement, an agreement between a limited number of like-minded states, and
China is excluded from it. Although ACTA principally aims at “combating
global proliferation of commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy,” according
to the Office of the US Trade Representative,28 it also involves the controver-
sial seizures by an ACTA member of generic drugs in transit between the
country of origin and the country of destination and therefore is a matter of
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concern for many developing countries.29 There were high-profile seizures of
consignments of Indian-made generic medicines for other developing coun-
tries by Dutch, French, and German authorities from 2008 to 2009.30
Two months after a draft text of the agreement was publicly released in
April 2010,31 China presented a statement to the TRIPS Council, criticizing
both the TRIPS-plus enforcement trend and the “mysterious” ACTA. In par-
ticular the statement urges that “the IP [intellectual property] chapter or pro-
visions of any RTA [regional trade agreement], FTA [free-trade agreement]
and regional IP Agreement to which a WTO Member is a party, shall not be
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement” and “the enforcements of IPRs by a
member in any bilateral, multilateral or regional trade agreement shall not cre-
ate distortions and impediments to legitimate international trade.”32 China’s
scholars bluntly claim that the design of ACTA is directly aimed at developing
countries, and that China is one of the major unnamed targets.33 Although Chi-
nese generic medicines were also held up by the Dutch customs authorities,34
there are few signs that China has taken any further action to file a complaint
or attempt to challenge TRIPS-plus standards, apart from presenting the afore-
mentioned statement to the TRIPS Council. Compared with India and Brazil,35
one may wonder whether China’s initial response to ACTA was only rhetoric.
China is likely annoyed more by the exclusive approach to ACTA adopted by
the United States, which did not treat China as an equal partner, than the
seizure of in-transit generic drugs and is concerned more about its exports of
intellectual property–intensive goods than the seizure.36
Producing Generic Drugs Under the TRIPS Framework? 
Domestically, since its membership negotiations with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO, China has made amendments to
its national patent law to incorporate TRIPS flexibilities into the legislation.
The first amendment was made in 1992, which removed the statement of “not
allowing compulsory license” from the original Article 52. The second
amendment was made in 2000 to the effect that government or individuals
can apply for compulsory licensing to eliminate or minimize the negative
effects caused by a monopoly on patent. After the Paragraph 6 system was
approved by the WTO, China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO)
promulgated “The Measures to Implement Compulsory Licensing” in 2003
and “The Measures to Implement Compulsory License Related to Public
Health Rights” in 2005 and put it into effect on 1 January 2006.37 The third
amendment of the national patent law, made in 2008, primarily serves to fine-
tune the country’s patent regulations. Under the new law, the country allows
local pharmaceutical firms to manufacture low-cost generic versions of ARVs
without the consent of patent holders. In March 2012, by integrating the 2003
and 2005 measures, the SIPO issued a revised version of “The Measures to
Implement Compulsory Licensing” which came into effect on 1 May 2012.38
302 China Joins Global Health Governance
With this amended patent law, China can legally use compulsory licens-
ing for local production and export of generic drugs. However, China has nei-
ther employed any compulsory licensing nor produced and exported generic
ARVs to developing countries. In contrast, Brazil and Thailand are more
active in using compulsory licensing.39 In discussing whether or not China
should follow these countries to allow compulsory licensing and parallel
importation of patented medicines, Chinese scholars indicate that the cases of
Brazil and Thailand could provide enlightenments for China to consider.
However, they do not elaborate on how China can utilize the compulsory
licensing domestically.40 On the other hand, other scholars argue that, while
both IPR and public health rights are essential, China’s health situation is not
a desperate crisis so that it has to use compulsory licensing. Rather, the gov-
ernment may consider using other means to increase domestic access to
essential drugs.41 In fact, it is claimed that China’s revisions of its patent laws
in 2012 were aimed at acquiring cheaper ARVs for its HIV/AIDS carriers at
home. China announced the revised version of “The Measures to Implement
Compulsory Licensing” not long after Gilead Sciences, a US pharmaceutical
firm producing Viread (also known as Tenofovir by its generic name) which
is recommended by the WHO as part of a first-line cocktail AIDS treatment,
signed an agreement in July 2011 with generic drug makers from four coun-
tries, China excluded, to share its patent rights. Nevertheless, after China
promulgated the new measure, Gilead offered concessions, including donat-
ing a substantial amount of Tenofovir to China if the Chinese government
continued to buy the same amount.42
In sum, China neither has a strong incentive to forge a structural reform
within the WTO nor to utilize the compulsory licensing under the Doha dec-
laration to make generic drugs more accessible for developing countries. A
puzzle facing us is why China does not utilize the mechanisms available to
it to produce more essential medicines, despite the fact that it has sufficient
manufacturing capacity in the sector, and its domestic legal framework
allows it to do so. In the following section, we explain China’s behavior and
its preferences toward the global health governance issue.
Making Sense of China’s Preferences
Why does China not avail itself of the public health safeguards accorded by
the TRIPS agreement and the Paragraph 6 system to produce and export its
own cheaper generic medicines to help sub-Saharan African countries and
people in the throes of public health crises? From both our literature review
and field research, we find that the issue is too complex for any single theo-
retical approach to explain fully. Echoing Peter Katzenstein and his collabo-
rators, we adopt an analytic eclectic approach that incorporates useful
insights of different mainstream theories (i.e., neorealism, neoliberal institu-
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tionalism, and social constructivism) to account for why China pursues its
preferences as it is observed.43 We postulate our arguments that the causal
forces of national identity, realist conception of national interests in terms of
material capabilities, and epistemic communities operate in tandem in shap-
ing China’s policymaking.
China’s Sui Generis Dualistic National Identities
Often based on social comparison as well as a division between us and them,
identity informs people who they are and what they should do in a given
environment.44 If European encounters with the East in the nineteenth cen-
tury bred a multilateral health regime out of the Western apprehension about
Asiatic diseases, China’s national identity was dramatically transformed by
its interactions and confrontation with the West since the late 1830s. Many
Chinese historians take the Opium War of 1839–1842 as the starting point of
modern China.45 Before that, China believed that it was the “Central King-
dom” at the center of the world, surrounded and respected by less civilized
tributary states or kingdoms, which periodically paid tribute to Chinese
emperors as sons of heaven. The wars with European and Japanese powers
and the defeats in the nineteenth century drastically transformed the long-
standing identity of China as a great power into one as a backward country,
humiliated by the West in a series of unequal treaties.46 China’s subsequent
modernization efforts as well as the post-Mao reforms have all been aimed
at reconstructing the old identity, restoring the glorious past and China’s
rightful place in the world. So on the one hand today’s China has to concede
that it is still a developing country, but on the other it desires to reclaim its
place as a developed one. With a self-belief that it is a victimized or
aggrieved power, China is eager to be recognized by the more advanced
countries as a respected and full member of the club of great powers on equal
footing, regardless of divergent political values and practices. While it seeks
support from, and lends a hand to, the developing world in facing accusations
of brutal human rights violations by the West and defending their common
interests in multilateral negotiations, China neither identifies itself positively
with the developing world nor views its current status favorably. China
aspires to move into the established powers, a positively valued group of
states, forming an in-group with them. An inevitable consequence of this
process is to treat other developing countries as members of the correspon-
ding out-group.47 In the quest for its lost identity and in the rapid transition
between a developing country and a more developed one, China lacks onto-
logical security or a stable identity in its international relations.48
Against this theoretical background, we may understand why China’s
preferences regarding the TRIPS agreement do not necessarily tally with the
interests of developing countries while it claims to be a member of the devel-
oping world. We assert that this is largely because China straddles the border
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between the developed and developing worlds. In terms of gross domestic
product (GDP), China is now the second-largest economy of the world, only
after the United States, and is now widely regarded as a rapidly rising power.
However, by the measure of GDP per capita, China is only a lower-middle-
income country, on a par with Algeria, Turkmenistan, and Ecuador.49 Some-
times its behavior and preferences are similar to the more industrialized
countries, but sometimes China has common interests with developing ones.
To compound the problem, it is in a process of proactively shedding its pre-
vious negative image as a weak and backward developing country as soon as
it can. Key to the process is to achieve rapid economic development by lever-
aging external resources and markets. A case-by-case study is required to
fathom its interests and explain the variations. The purposive content of
China’s sui generis national identity as a reemerging power defines that its
economic interests with regard to R&D are more in line with the industrial
West than with the less industrialized countries.50
China’s Realist Understanding of Global Health Governance
Our second observation is that China does not make rules in, and does not
accord great significance to, global health governance. We posit that this is
because of its realist understanding of global health governance. The struggle
for regaining its lost identity as a great power, which has long been under-
stood in terms of material capabilities of the state, produces and reproduces
historically rooted realpolitik behavior. One may wonder if China behaves as
a realist power. Conventional wisdom holds that due to the deeply ingrained
influence of Confucianism, which advocated righteous and virtuous rule, har-
mony, and conflict management by nonviolent means, China was historically
a benevolent power.51 However, this benign view of China has been subject
to mounting challenges in the past two decades or so. According to Alastair
Iain Johnston, in reality China subscribed to a realist approach to peace and
security and its traditional strategic culture shared the basic tenets with the
Western theory of realism; more importantly, Chinese realism was ideational
in nature or a learned behavior.52 This realpolitik worldview has persisted
beyond the collapse of imperial China into contemporary China after 1949.53
Externally China in the Cold War period was highly concerned about its sur-
vival in the face of security threats from the Soviet Union or the United
States, especially when it was excluded from the United Nations. Maoist
China was apt to use force against adversaries in foreign policy crises, espe-
cially those concerned with rivaling territorial claims.54 Regional multilateral
institutions in the Asia Pacific played only a little role in maintaining regional
peace and security. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–
centered institutions did not flourish until after 1991. Bilateral great power
politics continues to dominate regional international relations. All these fac-
tors combine to contribute to an uninterrupted development of a realpolitik
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strategic and political culture on the part of China. Successive generations of
Chinese leaders have since 1949 internalized the primacy of self-help under
international anarchy and put the pursuit of national security, national salva-
tion, and prosperity at the top of the policy agenda, with building “a rich state
and a strong army” or more recently increasing the “comprehensive national
strength” (zonghe guoli) as its primary development goals.55
Two impacts in particular are noteworthy for the purpose of this study.
First, not surprisingly, Chinese leaders have not attached much significance
to the positive roles of international institutions and global governance.
Accordingly, Chinese international relations scholars have been less exposed
to the narratives of neoliberal institutionalism than to neorealist, statist views.
We argue elsewhere that the notion of global governance did not enter Chi-
nese academic discourse until the early twenty-first century, more or less a
decade behind the West.56 An overwhelming majority of Chinese interna-
tional relations articles are about China’s relations with great powers, notably
the United States.57 The practice and the study of international relations influ-
ence each other through a self-reinforcing process. Second, this realpolitik
ideology drives China to respond to calls for global governance and collec-
tive action in a realist, self-regarding way.
Unlike the Waltzian balance-of-power realism, this Chinese version of
realism does not motivate the country to form military alliances with like-
minded states to balance against the United States in the post–Cold War
period. Paradoxically, this leads China to adopt a low-profile attitude toward
global governance in general and global health governance in particular
because China’s primary concern during US hegemony is no longer about
security but status.58 China has gone to great pains to capitalize on the most
benign external environment since the late 1830s to expedite economic
growth and attain the great-power status by strengthening economic and com-
mercial ties with, rather than confronting, the more advanced West.59 Priority
is given to attracting foreign direct investment in various Chinese industries
as well as maintaining unrestricted access to overseas markets.
Chinese realists, dubbed “China Firsters,”60 are concerned about the rel-
ative costs and gains of providing global public goods in global governance.
In the words of Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, a key proponent of Chi-
nese realism, asking China to take more responsibility for resolving global
problems “is a trap to exhaust [its] limited resources.”61 Their voices are
hardened by Deng Xiaoping’s famous admonitions of “hiding one’s capaci-
ties and biding one’s time” and “not seeking leadership” (taoguang yanghui;
buyao dangtou).62 While eschewing confrontation with the United States,
China has rejected the US proposal and notion of Group of 2 (G2) because
China perceives it as no less than a US burden-sharing strategy whereby a
declining United States calls on a rising China to take on greater global
responsibilities in order to help maintain US hegemony.63
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In the area of global public health, China has been more involved in bilat-
eral health diplomacy than in multilateral health governance. Since the early
twenty-first century when China began to reengage the African continent, its
commitment to improving Africa’s public health service has gained pace.
Besides continuously sending medical practitioners and medical materials to
African countries, it also promises to cooperate with them in the prevention
and treatment of infectious diseases as well as building medical-related infra-
structure.64 Nevertheless, its contribution to global health does not seem to
measure up to its growing economic wealth and status. While China is now
the world’s second-largest economy, its donations to the WHO are not gener-
ous at all. Between 2008 and 2009, its voluntary contribution to the WHO was
a mere $4.23 million, less than 0.3 percent of the total contributions from all
member states, far less than that of the United States or many members of the
Group of 8 (G8) countries. It fell to $1.22 million in 2010, lagging far behind
some medium and small powers such as Norway, Australia, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and Luxembourg. In terms of the percentage of GDP, Luxem-
bourg’s contribution in 2010 ($10.76 million) was 980 times that of China.65
China’s contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, an international financing institution dedicated to prevent and treat
the three infectious diseases, are not commensurate with its economic clout
either. As of December 2012, the Global Fund had disbursed a total of $761.56
million to China whereas China had pledged to contribute only $28 million in
the period 2003–2013, despite the fact that China holds the world’s largest for-
eign exchange reserves.66 This pattern of self-centered, low-profile behavior is
also reflective in China’s limited membership in international organizations
in comparison with other major and secondary powers in the developed and
developing worlds and in various regions. Using selected countries’ member-
ship in intergovernmental organizations as a benchmark, Table 1 shows the
relatively low degree of China’s engagement with global governance and insti-
tutions. In short, China stays on the periphery of global governance.
On the one hand, China is fearful of being isolated from the international
community and wants to earn acceptance as a great power on a par with the
Western powers, but on the other it is not yet motivated by any desire to
(re)shape the architecture of global governance. Seen in this light, the pro-
motion of Margaret Chan as director of the WHO should be interpreted as a
tactic to salvage its tarnished reputation and status in the wake of the SARS
fiasco, portraying China as a force for good, rather than as part of China’s
grand strategy of remoulding global health governance.
Lack of a Chinese Epistemic Community in Health Governance
As a corollary, the dominance of Chinese international studies by the realist
school, which focuses more on great-power politics (especially Sino-US rela-
tions) than on international institutions and global governance, results in a
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lack of capability to form an indigenous knowledge-based epistemic commu-
nity, and engage the established global epistemic communities, about access
to essential medicines as well as global health governance.67 In a globalizing
world of growing complexity and uncertainties, networks of knowledge-
based experts, according to international regime theory, can exert influence
over four phases of policy process—namely, policy innovation, policy diffu-
sion, policy selection, and policy persistence—by shaping political actors’
understanding of the issues and making them prone to choose one set of
norms and rules over the others.68 The TRIPS agreement is an international
law agreement with enormous implications for public health that are embed-
ded in the operations of pertinent international organizations, including the
WHO, the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the
Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) as well as international nongovernmental organizations.
Two expert groups in particular were influential in shaping the access norm,
national policymaking, and international policy coordination. They were the
UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) and the WHO Com-
mission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health
(CIPIH). In the CIPR there were six commissioners, of which two were from
the developing world (Carlos M. Correa of Argentina and Ramesh Mashelkar
of India), and the rest from the United States and the United Kingdom. The
commission visited five major developing countries, including China, organ-
ized ten workshops and a conference (in February 2002), commissioned
eleven study papers by specialists, and organized an online open forum invit-
ing comments before delivering its final report in September 2002.69 Subse-
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Table 1   China’s Participation in International Organizations Compared with Other
Major Developed and Developing Countries (in descending order), 2010
Total Membership in
Total Membership in Conventional
Conventional International Nongovernmental
Intergovernmental Organizations Organizations
Country (types A–D) (types A–D)
Germany 92 4,317
France 96 4,270
United Kingdom 79 4,076





South Africa 56 1,931
China 53 1,814
Source: Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International Organizations
2011/2012 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2011), pp. 43–51.
quently, the WHO set up in May 2003 the CIPIH, which in comparison with
CIPR was focused more on the impact of intellectual property rules on inno-
vation and access to medicines. Correa and Mashelkar continued to serve on
the WHO commission alongside three experts from the developing world
(Egypt, South Africa, and Thailand) and five from the industrialized West.
Akin to CIPR, CIPIH engaged its target audience by commissioning twenty-
one background papers by experts, holding workshops and one conference,
accepting submissions from the public, and organizing an open forum.70 The
two commissions concluded that the intellectual property regime does not
make much contribution to stimulating pharmaceutical innovation that would
meet the pressing health needs of developing countries. The reports of these
expert groups set an evolution of a new norm that stresses both innovation
and access (I+A) in motion.71
Apart from serving on the international commissions, the epistemic com-
munity’s influence can also be shown in the rapidly growing research on
global health governance in the West, much of it done by a community of
international law or international relations scholars.72 One of the research foci
is how informal norms of access to essential medicines and the right to health,
which are not codified into formal international law, take root and shape and
generate transnational social movements, political contestations between
developed countries and firms and the developing world, and long-lasting pol-
icy effects in international trade and global health governance.73 In stark con-
trast, our research finds that there are only a handful of social science experts
in China on the issues of the WHO, the WTO, and access to essential medi-
cines, and Chinese literature on the issue areas is limited if not scant.74 Chi-
nese experts were barely present in the activities of the CIPR and CIPIH.75
This lack of expertise in the relevant fields of global health governance has
undermined Chinese policymakers’ grasp of the controversies surrounding the
debates and norm changes about access to medicines as well as Chinese schol-
ars’ ability to communicate and work in cooperation with a transnational epis-
temic community of global health governance. All in all, they hamper a
diffusion of new ideas and norms into China, and policy coordination between
China and other developing countries and stakeholding actors.
China’s Agenda: 
Incubating Its Nascent Pharmaceutical Industry
Can our conceptual framework help us understand China’s grand strategy
regarding the public health sector and its wider implications for global health
governance beyond compulsory licensing? Similar to other developing coun-
tries, China has been facing the pricing problem of patented HIV/AIDS med-
icines. It can produce only limited supplies of generic drugs locally, but they
are less effective and with strong side effects. There have been calls for the
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Chinese government to make use of compulsory licensing to increase the
availability of generic versions of HIV/AIDS medicines for Chinese patients.
In response, Wen Xikai, a SIPO official, was quoted as saying that “theoreti-
cally, China can declare that the country is in an emergency situation and
imposes compulsory licensing to allow it to make generic drugs. But we have
to take some economic factors into consideration. Imposing compulsory
licensing reduces but does not eliminate cost. We should offer satisfactory
compensation to the drug makers who own the patents.”76 Chinese scholars
also state that the country’s pharmaceutical industry is in the process of tran-
sition. Although China has legislated compulsory licensing to produce
generic drugs in the event of a public health crisis, they argue it will be
myopic if China focuses only on producing generic drugs. A long-term solu-
tion to any public health crisis must rely on the ability to develop new
drugs.77 Anonymous experts, cited by the China Daily, also echo that com-
pulsory licensing would both “encourage [Chinese] pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to produce generic drugs rather than develop new ones” and
“discourage pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed countries from
developing new and more effective drugs.”78 In other words, stimulating
R&D should be the first priority for China.
An examination of China’s investment in pharmaceutical R&D over the
past decade reaffirms that China shares little immediate interests with many
sub-Saharan African countries in the matter of patents. Due to rapid eco-
nomic growth and a soaring domestic demand for Western medicines, China
has successfully lured multinational pharmaceutical firms to establish part-
nerships and research centers in China.79 China has opened its doors to for-
eign investment and has made investment in R&D a high national priority.
Some WTO and WHO officials in Geneva have argued that China wishes to
maintain good relations with developed countries as well as major pharma-
ceutical companies from the West because Beijing intends to make patent or
intellectual property work for the country’s economic development.80 While
many developing countries have sought help from the WHO to address prob-
lems with intellectual property, China has never asked for assistance.81
China’s twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) has designated seven strate-
gic emerging industries (zhanluexing xinxing chanye) as the primary drivers
for, and the backbone of, China’s future economic development. Beijing has
set a goal of increasing the contributions of the seven strategic emerging
industries to the national economy from 5 percent of GDP in 2010 to 8 per-
cent by 2015, and 15 percent by 2020.82 Biotechnology is one of these key
strategic emerging industries. The plan supports the development of innova-
tive biotech products, high-end medical devices, and patented medicines.
According to the consultancy firm APCO Worldwide, the central and local
governments and private sector are expected to spend more than 14 trillion
yuan ($2.16 trillion) in those five years. In line with this development strat-
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egy, China’s National Development and Reform Commission amended in
December 2011 its “Industry Catalogue for Foreign Investments” whereby
foreign investments in pharmaceutical distribution business, covering both
wholesale and retail, are removed from the “restricted” category and the man-
ufacturing of novel vaccines is added to the “encouraged” category.83
Beijing also has lofty ambitions for registering and protecting patents. In
November 2010 the SIPO released a National Patent Development Strategy, in
which China set the annual filings of 2 million domestic patents as its target
for 2015. In 2012 the SIPO granted 1.26 million patents to domestic and over-
seas applicants after receiving 2.05 million applications from them.84 Accord-
ingly, China’s patent cooperation treaty (PCT) applications to the WIPO have
been growing rapidly, rising from 2,512 filings in 2005 to 16,406 filings in
2011. China’s share of the total PCT applications grew from 2 percent to 9
percent in the same period. In 2010, while the advanced countries, such as the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, reduced their total number of PCT fil-
ings, China had an astonishingly high growth rate of 33.4 percent (see Table
2). This high growth rate can be partly explained by the fact that China started
from a low base: in 2005 it had the lowest number of filings among the coun-
tries under comparison, and partly because China is eager to catch up with the
need to protect its commercial interests in competition with other innovation-
intensive countries. China is now among the top five sources of international
patent applications.85 It is anticipated that China will be a major force in pro-
ducing patented products, including medicines, in the coming years.
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Table 2   Top Ten Patent Cooperation Treaty Applications by Country of Origin, 2005–2009
Country 2011 2010–2011
of Origin 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Share (%) Change (%)
United States 46,858 51,280 54,043 51,638 45,617 44,890 48,596 26.7 8.0
Japan 24,870 27,025 27,743 28,760 29,802 32,180 38,888 21.4 21.0
Germany 15,987 16,736 17,821 18,855 16,797 17,558 18,568 10.2 5.7
China 2,512 3,942 5,455 6,120 7,900 12,295 16,406 9.0 33.4
South Korea 4,689 5,945 7,064 7,899 8,035 9,668 10,447 5.7 8.0
France 5,756 6,256 6,560 7,072 7,237 7,288 7,664 4.2 5.8
United Kingdom 5,096 5,097 5,542 5,466 5,044 4,908 4,844 2.7 –1.0
Switzerland 3,294 3,621 3,833 3,799 3,671 3,728 3,999 2.2 7.3
Netherlands 4,504 4,553 4,433 4,363 4,462 4,078 3,494 1.9 –14.0
Sweden 2,887 3,336 3,655 4,137 3,567 3,314 3,466 1.9 4.6
Sources:World Intellectual Property Organization, The International Patents System Yearly Review: Devel-
opments and Performance in 2009 (Geneva: WIPO, 2009), p. 15; World Intellectual Property Organization, The
International Patents System Yearly Review: Developments and Performance in 2010 (Geneva: WIPO, 2010),
p. 13; World Intellectual Property Organization, 2012 PCT Yearly Review: The International Patent System
(Geneva: WIPO, 2012), p. 27.
In order to encourage innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, the pro-
tection of intellectual property on drugs is deemed essential; hence, China is
careful not to utilize compulsory licensing for the production of generic drugs
as it pleases.86 A typical case was that of Guangzhou Baiyunshan. When the
Chinese pharmaceutical firm applied for a compulsory license in 2009 to pro-
duce a generic version of Tamiflu, the most promising treatment for avian
influenza produced by the Swiss company Roche, its application was not
approved. According to Chinese scholars on medicine and patent laws,
Baiyunshan had a legal right, granted by Article 49 of the national patent law,
to request a compulsory license, and the company had sufficient capability
to manufacture the drug as it had effectively developed a generic product of
Tamiflu, named Futai, in 2005.87 However, in discussing the net benefits of
employing compulsory licensing, Chinese scholars tend to argue that the dis-
advantages outweigh the advantages due to the likelihood that China would
face a backlash from international pharmaceutical firms. China cannot ignore
the mounting pressure from patent holders and should consider the aftermath
of issuing compulsory licenses for the long-term development of the coun-
try’s pharmaceutical industry.88 A Chinese scholar on global health gover-
nance argues that, while China should not be fearful of trade sanctions or
retaliation from the West, its first priority seems to suggest that this mecha-
nism should be reserved for curbing the most threatening infectious diseases
inside the country; namely, hepatitis B and tuberculosis. Up to 120 million
Chinese people have been infected with hepatitis B.89
Owing to its rapidly growing R&D sector and the potential commercial
benefits, China’s interests in patent protection align more with the industrial-
ized West than with the developing world. It has little incentive to lend solid
support to African countries on relaxing patent requirements under the TRIPS
agreement. Unlike Brazil, Thailand, and those African countries with high
HIV prevalence rates, China has largely complied with the intellectual prop-
erty rules since its entry into the WTO in 2001, and has shown little sign that
it has any intention of overturning the current patent regime on medicines.
Likewise, there are few reports on China’s participation in South-South coop-
eration in generic drug manufacturing. 
Echoing what has been claimed that “most industrialized countries
adopted product patent protection systems once they had already reached a
high degree of economic development,”90 China’s pharmaceutical industry,
a relatively advanced industrial sector in more developed urban areas, is in
favor of enhanced patent protection. The national agenda is to nourish its
emerging pharmaceutical industry to develop its own patented medicines that
are as good as the West’s to address its domestic pressing health issues. This
is to be accomplished by making the industrial sector appealing to major pro-
ducers in the more advanced West to invest in China. This policy can be
understood as part of China’s self-regarding realpolitik strategy to pursue
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wealth and power and to regain its past glory. The fluidity of national identity
has a direct bearing on the positioning and preferences of the nascent phar-
maceutical industry. It remains to be seen whether or not increased supplies
of patented medicines by Chinese drug makers will indirectly lead to a cor-
responding enhanced access to essential medicines by the developing world.
However, promoting greater availability of medicines for life-threatening
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa obviously is not high on
China’s agenda. One cannot also rule out the possibility that, under the
imperative to acquire wealth and to restore to global preeminence, Chinese-
made patented medicines might be targeted at the lucrative market of the
developed world.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom has it that China would avail itself of the flexibilities
accorded by the TRIPS agreement, the Doha declaration, and the Paragraph 6
system to increase the supply and availability of affordable HIV drugs for the
benefit of the poor in the Global South. This is so because the rules were not
made by China and they have not been seen as serving the interests of China
as a developing country and a rising power. However, the reality is that China
has been unwilling to do so. A simple answer to this puzzle is that the TRIPS
agreement and its emphasis on intellectual property suit China’s primary
interests in seeking long-term innovation-intensive economic modernization
and regaining its lost status as a great power. As shown in this study of the
country’s pharmaceutical industry, Chinese policymakers attach much signif-
icance to higher value-added industrial sectors and to attracting external
investments in them. Apart from refuting the received wisdom, the contribu-
tions of this article are not only about how China pursues its material inter-
ests, but also about how it identifies and develops its interests. 
By employing an analytic eclectic approach to explaining the puzzle, we
first postulate that a key factor that influences China’s engagement with
global health governance is its sui generis national identity. It straddles the
developed and developing worlds. As a rapidly emerging power but having
up to 30 percent of its population living in poverty,91 China’s external behav-
ior and interests are not always in agreement with either the developed or the
developing worlds. In order to attract foreign direct investment and to pro-
mote its own nascent higher value-added pharmaceutical industry, an engine
of capital-intensive economic growth, China does not want to challenge the
existing intellectual property regime. While supporting other developing
countries rhetorically, it has been playing a low-profile role in the fight for
transformative change in the global health regime, without taking a leader-
ship role in the attempts by the South to revise the TRIPS agreement. Still in
the throes of a struggle with ontological insecurity, China is primarily a sta-
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tus-seeking and self-centered emerging power that remains essentially con-
cerned about national rejuvenation to cleanse its inferior identity as an eco-
nomically backward and militarily weak country. Of paramount importance
to regaining its rightful great-power status is the leveraging of external
resources for its own economic development during the time when its physi-
cal security is not in great jeopardy. Waving the flag of the developing world
in managing global health affairs is a low priority for present-day China.
China’s craving for great-power status and identity adds force to the
realist school of thought in both scholarly and policy circles inside the coun-
try. The Chinese isolationist view on global health governance can be attrib-
utable to the realist concern over the costs and benefits involved in
managing global governance. The traumatic experience that many Chinese
underwent in the “Century of Humiliation and Shame” has given rise to a
stronger voice of statist realism than other schools of thought in China.
Under the strong influence of a historically driven realpolitik ideology,
China always conceives of great powers in terms of material capabilities,
downplays the positive roles of international institutions and global gover-
nance in its quest for security and status, and now elects a low-profile and
self-help path toward involving itself in global health governance. Harbor-
ing a view that China’s increased engagement with global governance is
beyond its material capabilities and it would only fall in a trap set by the
West for it, a sizable segment of the Chinese realist school argues for a mod-
est degree of Chinese participation. Being able to keep its house, with more
than 1.3 billion people, in good order is often considered by the Chinese as
already a major contribution to global health governance.92
According to neoliberal institutional knowledge-based regime theory, the
ascendancy of the norm about access to medicines is due partly to the growth
of an epistemic community in global health governance in the West, which
elucidates the politics, domestic and international, behind the TRIPS agree-
ment and the succeeding developments, and helps to reframe the issue as a
matter of human rights and galvanize the calls by civil society organizations
for reforming the rules about patented medicines. We have found, however,
that there is no Chinese counterpart of the global health epistemic commu-
nity. The study of global health governance by Chinese social scientists is
underdeveloped owing to the dominance of the realist school. This inhibits
the diffusion of novel norms into China’s policymaking process as well as
policy coordination between China and other major generic medicine–pro-
ducing countries. 
We began this article by asking if the rise of China will inevitably lead to
structural changes in global governance. Our study suggests that this is not
necessarily the case. As far as global health governance is concerned, China
is a pro–status quo and reactive power. To reiterate our earlier caveat, a case-
by-case study is required to fathom China’s changing identities and interests
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in other issue areas and explain the variations. An implication, however, is
that despite the media hype about when China would overtake the United
States as the world’s largest economy, the country has a long way to go
before it can become a genuine great power that can make new rules for the
rest of the world in global governance.  
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